Voters are also expected to respond to these differential personal vote cultivation attempts of politicians. This article aims to open the black box of personal voting on the voters’ side. Six countries are identified in the CSES data to employ preferential or open party list systems. The CSES reports and codes up to three candidate names mentioned by the respondent.11 Individuals for whom the correctly identified candidate name and their party were not reported are dropped from this particular analysis. FundingThe author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. districts of small magnitude, i.e. proportional representation. Single-Member Districts (or SMD) Canada 308 308 1-USA 435 435 1-India 543 543 1-France 577 577 1 In the next section, I will provide additional support to the idea that individual campaign messages are driving these differences in CR, rather than differences in long-term personal vote cultivation. In short, this estimation strategy takes the survey structure of the data into account by introducing election fixed effects, weighting and calculating clustered standard errors at the district level. The interaction of district magnitude with list type is a crucial element linking voters reacting to personal vote-seeking in elections (Canache et al., 2000; Carey and Shugart, 1995; Grimmer et al., 2012), to politicians’ identities (Shugart et al., 2005) and behaviour in parliament (André and Depauw, 2013; André et al., 2014; Chang and Golden, 2006; Crisp et al., 2004; Däubler et al., 2016; Stratmann and Baur, 2002), to ultimately holding legislators to account (Mitchell, 2000). To further support the idea that a differentially focused campaign drives the results on CR, I consider an alternative mechanism (long-term PC), analyse the differences between voters and non-voters, and conduct a district-level investigation of the names remembered. Doubling the district magnitude (or an increase by 172%) leads to no significant change in the odds of recognising a candidate in open list systems, but is associated with a predicted increase of 76% in the odds of recognising a candidate in closed list systems.10 Therefore, there is a clear interaction effect between district magnitude and list type on CR (in support of H2a and H2b), along the lines predicted by Carey and Shugart (1995) if the underlying mechanism is intra-party competition influencing personal vote-seeking in campaigns and short-term information processing. Country Population Size Number of Electoral Districts District Magnitude (M) Upper Tier (Compensatory Seats) 1. Finally, column 4 of Table 9 presents results of a model with an election fixed effects and a random effect at district level. (2013). Instead, this article uses individual name recognition data from voters to assess how the electoral system has affected their information processing about individual candidates, using information from the first wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of predicted probabilities from an estimation that allows for a differential effect of district magnitude and list type for voters and non-voters (the results from a regression including this three-way interaction can be found in Table 4 in the Appendix 1). Employing survey data from the first wave of the CSES, I found that district magnitude affects CR according to the list type of the electoral system. To assess whether electoral rules affect information processing, this article focuses on short-term campaign effects on CR. In separate analyses, I control for political knowledge, party identification and political interest.8. Therefore, voters are more likely to remember a representative in districts of larger size. To sum up, when designing an electoral system, the district magnitude is … We should also expect district magnitude to affect information processing differently according to list type. district magnitude, increases. Table 1 shows that average CR in open list systems is only 57%. As district magnitude increases, so does proportionality Explain the "M+1" rule. District Averages of Candidate Recognition. With increasing district magnitude, the probability that a well-known politician (e.g. What does it mean for elections? This article tied the personal vote-seeking attempts of politicians more closely to the personal voting response, by analysing information processing. 10. Direct measure of congruence between representatives and voter preferences, Analyze relationship between congruence and district magnitude, Lower congruence of individual legislators in larger electoral districts, However, higher congruence of majority of legislators in larger districts, Evidence for existence of a law of large numbers in political representation. magnitude on voting behavior independently from voters’ preferences or the number of parties. the interaction effect of district magnitude in open list systems). Electoral rules may affect political outcomes through a variety of channels. In the real world, however, candidates with the qualities necessary to design effective policies are scarce. Sharing links are not available for this article. However, the results are robust to employing district magnitude instead. Some society journals require you to create a personal profile, then activate your society account, You are adding the following journals to your email alerts, Did you struggle to get access to this article? H2 (district magnitude). Overall, voters are more likely to recognise a candidate than non-voters, but the effect of increasing the district magnitude according to list type is attenuated for voters (dashed lines). Therefore, similar tests were conducted for the effect of district magnitude and list type on long-term personal vote cultivation presented in Figure 2 (corresponding to Table 5 in the Appendix 1). Hence, we investigate Hence, we investigate this issue in a laboratory experiment, where we vary district magnitude while keeping the distribution of voters’ It is well established that individual parliamentary representatives are less likely to decide according to the preferences of their constituency when the number of representatives per district, i.e. The Interaction Effect between List Type and District Magnitude The last two results are driven by the To send . Cox (2007) suggests that as district magnitude increases, the proportion of voters that behave strategically decreases, while the proportion who votes sincerely for their most preferred party increases. Another argument for H2 is that the race in larger districts is likely to receive more attention from the national media. To sum up, when designing an electoral system, district magnitude is in many ways the key factor in determining However, they do find a statistically significant difference between MEPs in terms of their perceived goal of the campaign: fewer of the MEPs elected through closed list systems reply that maximising their own personal votes is the purpose of their campaign as compared to MEPs elected in open list systems. From the first module of the CSES, responses to a question about CR are available for 11 elections between 1996 and 2001 with multi-member constituencies in European countries (see Table 1). In closed list systems, the candidates can co-ordinate their campaign on the famous politician (i.e. Table 3. Again, this supports the idea that campaigns are more focused in closed list systems and overwhelm voters with candidate-specific information in open list systems. The e-mail addresses that you supply to use this service will not be used for any other purpose without your consent. Name Concentration, District Magnitude and List Type. While there are important differences between these systems as to whether extending a personal preference can influence the order in which candidates are elected, the open systems are similar in that they present the voter with minimal incentives to engage with candidates’ names, as compared to systems that do not present such incentives at all. Time elapsed refers to the number of days between the election and the moment when the survey was taken.7 The CSES also provides questions which assess the political interest or knowledge of individuals, as well as their partisan identification. The personal vote literature emphasises the development of long-term relationships through constituency work and PC. Therefore, I argue that this article’s positive effect of district magnitude on CR in closed list systems only, is consistent with a more focused campaign in closed list systems. If legislators are not encouraged to discern Note: Predicted probabilities based on estimation results of model 2 of Table 6 in the Appendix 1. Table 7. These results are not shown but are available from the author on request. Hence, the campaign can be focused on a famous politician in the top ranks or on a smaller number of candidates from a larger selection pool when district magnitude is larger. 2.The data source is the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES, 2003, August 4). Abstract It is well established that individual parliamentary representatives are less likely to decide according to the preferences of their constituency when the number of representatives per district, i.e. Electoral systems with some choice over candidates within parties (open list systems) incentivise politicians to target voters individually and draw out the personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Crisp et al., 2004; Hallerberg and Marier, 2004). However, the analysis presented below is not driven by any particular country, as the results are robust to excluding any one of the open list countries from the analysis at a time.3 I consider CR as a proxy for what voters know about individual candidates.4 A dummy CR indicates whether a respondent remembered at least one candidate’s name.5 A second dummy PC is one when a respondent had been in touch with a politician over the last 12 months before the election. Shugart et al. In the 2002 Portuguese election in the district of Lisboa (district magnitude of 48), we find a concentration index of 0.86, almost entirely driven by José Manuel Barossa, leader of the Social Democratic Party, and previous minister. The relationship between district magnitude, list type and CR is modelled in the following manner. Dichotomous variables were set to zero In other words, while increasing the district magnitude leads to no less concentration in names mentioned in closed list systems, it does lead to less concentration in open list systems. In open list systems, these candidates increase their personal vote appeals and voters become overwhelmed with candidate-specific information (i.e. Table 8. Overall, this is much more likely in closed list systems (full line) than in open list systems (dashed line). Ideally, elections for representative bodies result in the selection of those candidates that both perfectly represent the preferences of the electorate and design effective policies. Fitted Probabilities of the H Name Concentration Index. These influences are also larger for non-voters than for voters. I have read and accept the terms and conditions, View permissions information for this article. Table 5. District magnitude refers to the number of representatives returned (or elected) from a district. The Primary Effect: Preference Votes and Political Promotions, How Words and Money Cultivate a Personal Vote: The Effect of Legislator Credit Claiming on Constituent Credit Allocation, District Magnitude and the Comparative Study of Strategic Voting, Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries, Candidate Recognition in Different Electoral Systems, Assessing the Mechanical and Psychological Effects of District Magnitude, The Responsive Voter: Campaign Information and the Dynamics of Candidate Evaluation, Voters and Their Representatives: Electoral Institutions and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies, What Voters Do: Information Search during Election Campaigns, Information Heterogeneity, Complexity and the Vote Calculus, Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation, Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ across Electoral Systems, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, Demoted Leaders and Exiled Candidates: Disentangling Party and Person in the Voter’s Mind, Centralized Personalization at the Expense of Decentralized Personalization: The Decline of Preferential Voting in Belgium (2003–2014), Remembering One’s Representative: How District Magnitude and List Type Affect Candidate Recognition, http://www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/, https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage, John M Carey and Matthew S Shugart (1995), The Combined Impact of Decentralisation and Personalism on the Nationalisation of Party Systems. In larger districts with more candidates up for election, we can then expect intense campaign attention for a few (well-known) individuals, which makes respondents more likely to remember these politicians. [email protected]leidenuniv.nl. Earlier results were therefore not driven by ceiling effects resulting from the binary coding of the candidate recognition variable. Fitted Probabilities From a Multinomial Logistic Analysis of Individual Candidate Recognition for a Voter: No Correct Name (graph 1), One Correct Name (graph 2) and Two or More Correct Names (graph 3). H1 (list type). Figure 5. where si2 is the share of the name i (i = 1,…,n) in the group of names mentioned from party p of district d at election e. The normalised Herfindahl index ranges from zero to one. As district magnitude increases, more people remember at least one candidate in closed list systems, but there is no such effect in open list systems. Note: Predicted probabilities based on estimation results of model 2 of Table 7. However, increasing the district magnitude is estimated to result in less PC across both list systems. John M Carey and Matthew S Shugart (1995) argued that increasing the district magnitude will increase intra-party competition in open list systems but decrease competition between party candidates in closed list systems. If long-term personal vote cultivation explains this relation with CR, we should find similar effects of the electoral system features on PC. As district magnitude increases, the number of candidates and the probability of a famous candidate among them increases. They find support for this theory based on an overall association of district magnitude and list type with the number of local politicians (i.e. This is consistent with existing findings from observational data. Note: Predicted probabilities based on estimation results of model 3 of Table 5 in the Appendix 1. Political Contact, District Magnitude and List Type. Under this condition, Matland argues, the correlation I point to a three-way interaction effect with whether the respondent indicated to have voted or not. It is well known that larger district magnitude increases the proportionality of the seat-vote relationship (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989, p. 113), and that the seat bonus of large parties decreases as district magnitude increases (Sartori, 1968). Respondents from districts of larger district magnitudes are less likely to mention the same names than respondents from smaller districts, in open list systems only. Brenda Van Coppenolle, Leiden University, Institute of Political Science, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK Leiden, The Netherlands; email: b.k.s.van. There is no such effect of district magnitude under electoral systems with choice over candidates. Hence, district magnitude affects what people remember about who runs to be their representative, and therefore arguably also whether and how they can hold them to account. Many studies of survey data concerned with vote choice disregard respondents who report not to have voted in the election. whether a respondent remembered zero, one, or two or more names correctly). By continuing to browse We use cookies to help provide and enhance our service and tailor content and ads. For more information view the SAGE Journals Sharing page. First, I present results from a multinomial logistic regression, comparing whether respondents offered ‘2 or more correct candidate names’ versus ‘Only 1 correct candidate name’. If voters also react to these strategies, their knowledge about candidates should be influenced by these features of the electoral system. In general, this article therefore further underlines the importance of studying interaction effects of district magnitude with other electoral system features. Alternatively, we could estimate district averages, or a multilevel random effects model (with random effects introduced at country and district level) to deal with the complex survey structure. Politicians can be expected to seek to cultivate the personal vote in open list systems. In open list systems, we found no effect of increasing district magnitude and argued that this was due to voters becoming overwhelmed with candidate-specific information. In open list systems, district magnitude was found to have a statistically significantly negative effect for non-voters. corruption becomes more (less) severe as district magnitude increases under open-list (closed-list) PR. In closed list systems as the district magnitude increases, there are few incentives for candidates to emphasise person-specific information. West European Politics: Vol. However, non-voters are of interest here, as they will have been subject to the same campaign messages, but they may have been less motivated to process the information consciously. Yet, even such small differences may matter for determining the future leadership (Folke et al., 2016). However, as district magnitude rises, people become more likely to recognise a candidate in closed list systems only, the predicted probability of recognising a candidate name increases along with district magnitude (see Figure 1). CR clearly rises with district magnitude in closed list systems (left panel) but declines in open list systems (right panel). The results are presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 8. Voters and non-voters have also long been thought to be able to resist information presented in electoral campaigns to different degrees (Zaller, 1992) and information matters for election outcomes (Bartels, 1996). indicate that district magnitude (a) increases electoral support for small parties, (b) increases the (eıective) number of parties getting seats, and (c) reduces … There are essentially two ways in which politicians can supply information to voters. Unfortunately, the list placement of candidates mentioned by respondents cannot be retrieved from the CSES data, so I cannot directly test whether these results are indeed consistent with centralised or decentralised personalisation. The results are robust to excluding this control for time elapsed. Incorrect answers were not included in the overall candidate recognition tally and were also dropped in this district-party level analysis. In addition, once district magnitude exceeds a certain threshold â The corresponding specifications allow district magnitude and list type to have a differential effect on CR for voters and non-voters, by adding interaction terms. However, we propose that for majority decisions of district representatives the opposite holds due to the existence of a law of large numbers in political representation. Therefore, it is not the case that the proportion remembering at least one candidate is already so high in the open list systems that increasing district magnitude cannot further boost the recognition. If there are such ceiling effects, employing a continuous measure instead should still show a positive effect of district magnitude on (continuous) name recognition even in open list systems. As a result of the intra-party competition created by electoral rules, citizens of different countries have been confronted with different campaigns and responded differently to these personal vote-seeking attempts. Especially when studying recognition, we expect that an increase of one on the scale of district magnitude for a constituency with, for example, two to three elected members is much more important than a change for a constituency with say 25 to 26 elected members. Education and income are measured on a scale of 8-points and 5-points, respectively, and will be interacted with election dummies in the analysis, to account for potential different measurement procedures across countries. Figure 1 which depicts predicted probabilities for a respondent who voted also does not offer strong support for this alternative interpretation. At small district magnitudes, closed-list PR is associated with more corruption, but corruption is more widespread in open-list District magnitude varies across list type, but the mean and range of district magnitude are similar across both types of lists (see Table 2 in the Appendix 1). How voters choose between these two kinds of candidate… Unlike the other models, the multilevel model is fitted to unweighted data. Unsurprisingly, and in line with the predictions of the personal vote theory, voters in open list electoral systems are more likely to remember a candidate name than in closed list systems (see also Curtice and Shively, 2009; Norris, 2004). 6.The results are robust to employing district magnitude instead. 10.This calculation is based on model 4 of Table 4 in the Appendix 1. As in the baseline estimations, the coefficients presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 are statistically significant at a 1% level and in the predicted direction.
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